Our streets.
Our rights.
DeFlock Pleasanton.
Automated license plate readers (ALPRs), including systems from Flock Safety, create a system of 24×7 vehicle surveillance: cameras photograph passing vehicles and turn those observations into searchable records of where a vehicle was seen and when.
You should not have to surrender your privacy simply because you drive on a public street.
Demand action from Pleasanton See Pleasanton's camera map
What are Flock cameras?
Flock Safety cameras are automated license plate readers. They can capture a vehicle's license plate along with characteristics such as make, model, color and distinguishing features, and associate the observation with a location and time. The result is searchable vehicle-location data—not only about people suspected of crimes, but about ordinary drivers whose vehicles pass a camera.
Always watching
Roadside cameras operate continuously, creating records as vehicles pass day and night.
Searchable movement
Individual sightings may look innocuous. Aggregated over time and across locations, they can reveal patterns of travel, association and daily life.
Network effect
The civil-liberties concern grows when local observations become accessible through larger interconnected law-enforcement networks.
Where are your movements being recorded?
Would you like to see where your license plate is being captured in Pleasanton, along with photos and metadata about your vehicle?
See the community-maintained DeFlock map showing known automated license plate reader locations. Camera locations can change, and community maps may not identify every camera.
VIEW THE PLEASANTON CAMERA MAP →The Fourth Amendment matters
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mass, suspicionless collection of vehicle-location data raises profound constitutional questions about how much of our movements government should be able to reconstruct without a warrant.
Privacy and civil-liberties advocates argue that warrantless searches of large ALPR databases can violate constitutional privacy protections. Courts continue to address how the Fourth Amendment applies to this technology, so the precise legal rule is still developing. Our position is simple: Pleasanton should not operate a 24×7 mass-surveillance system first and wait for constitutional limits to catch up later.
Pleasanton has already seen what can go wrong
Federal access to Pleasanton license plate data
In July 2026, Pleasanton Police acknowledged that its previous Motorola Vigilant automated license plate reader system had allowed federal agencies access to local license plate reader data despite restrictions under California law and city policy.
The system involved in that disclosure preceded Pleasanton's current Flock deployment, but the episode demonstrates the fundamental risk created by large searchable vehicle-location databases: once the data exists, residents must depend on policies, access controls, audits and enforcement to determine who can search it and why.
READ THE LOCAL REPORT →What happens after the technology changes?
Pleasanton's previous ALPR controversy involved Motorola Vigilant rather than Flock. Replacing one vendor does not eliminate the larger policy questions: who can search vehicle-location data, how sharing is controlled, how searches are audited, and what happens when another agency requests information.
San Francisco: Flock data searched outside California
Reporting by the San Francisco Standard described extensive out-of-state searches of San Francisco's Flock ALPR data, including searches associated with immigration enforcement. It illustrates how locally collected vehicle data can become part of a much larger surveillance network.
Read the investigation →Get The Flock Out of Pleasanton!
Join the discussion. Connect with local residents, share information, stay informed about city actions, and help end automated mass vehicle surveillance in Pleasanton.
JOIN THE DISCUSSION →Take action in Pleasanton
Demand that Pleasanton's elected leaders end the city's Flock camera program, reject expansion or renewal, disclose contracts and audit logs, investigate and publicly document data-sharing practices, and require meaningful public debate before deploying mass-surveillance technology.
Contact the Mayor and City Council and ask for a public accounting of Pleasanton's automated license plate reader program.
CONTACT THE MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL →Current officials and contact information should be verified against the City of Pleasanton website, especially after elections.
Watch: how the surveillance network works
Watch directly on YouTube: “Flock Cameras Legally Spy On You. It's The Law.”
Learn more. Get involved.
DeFlock camera map
See known ALPR camera locations around Pleasanton on the community-maintained DeFlock map.
View Pleasanton on the map →Get The Flock Out of Pleasanton
Connect with local residents, share information, organize and stay informed.
Join the Facebook group →DeFlock.org
Community resources, mapping and information about automated license plate reader surveillance.
Visit DeFlock.org →Electronic Frontier Foundation
Research and reporting on ALPR surveillance, civil liberties, data sharing and community action.
EFF street-level surveillance →ACLU — Get the Flock Out
Campaign resources explaining concerns about nationwide ALPR mass surveillance and ways communities can respond.
ACLU campaign resources →Pleasanton public records
Request contracts, invoices, camera locations, data-sharing settings, search audit logs, policies, access records and correspondence related to ALPR and Flock use.
City of Pleasanton →Local reporting
Read the July 2026 report about federal access to data from Pleasanton's previous automated license plate reader system.
Read the report →Our neighbors are organizing too
Automated license plate surveillance does not stop at city limits. Follow the parallel effort in Livermore.
Visit DeFlock Livermore →What to demand
Demand a public accounting of how many cameras are deployed, where they are located, what they cost, how long data is retained, who can search it, which outside agencies or networks can access it, how often searches occur without a warrant, and whether every search is independently audited.