Pleasanton
ALPR program.
What Pleasanton's own records say about its automated license plate reader program, checked against those records on 19 October 2026.
Documented stated in the record (click to open it) · Calculated our arithmetic from documented figures (hover or tap to see it) · Unknown not established by any record we have.
What is an ALPR? What is Flock?
An Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) is a camera system that captures license plates and vehicle information and makes those observations available for computer-assisted searching.
Documented · PPD ALPR page ↗ Documented · Flock portal ↗ Pleasanton Police says it has operated fixed ALPR cameras since 2019 and now uses a Flock system exclusively. Its Flock portal says the Department runs retroactive searches to solve crimes after they occur and uses real-time alerts on hot-listed vehicles. The portal lists the California Stolen Vehicle System and NCMEC Amber Alerts as its hotlist sources.
From Vigilant to Flock, and a Border Patrol error
Documented · July 2026 memo ↗ Pleasanton began a Flock pilot in 2021 and later replaced its Vigilant (Motorola Solutions) system with Flock. The City cancelled the Vigilant contract in October 2025, but Vigilant cameras at three Caltrans-controlled locations kept collecting data until they were deactivated on 8 July 2026.
Documented · July 2026 memo ↗ In a 17 July 2026 memo, the Interim City Manager and the Police Chief acknowledged two errors. The San Diego Sector Border Patrol, a federal agency, had been listed as a state agency on Vigilant's sharing report, so it stayed eligible to search data from those three locations until 8 July 2026. Vigilant did not log outside-agency searches, so the City says there is no record of whether Border Patrol actually searched Pleasanton data.
Documented · July 2026 memo ↗ The same memo says the City rechecked its Flock sharing report and found no unauthorized agencies. It also notes that the Department's semiannual audits do not verify the accuracy of the sharing report.
What we are not claiming: We are not claiming the current Flock system has been shown to share Pleasanton data with a federal or out-of-state agency, or that Border Patrol actually searched the former Vigilant data.
How many cameras?
Documented · July 2025 memo ↗ Documented ceiling · Council agenda ↗ On 15 July 2025 the Council approved a five-year Flock agreement for expansion of the ALPR program. The staff report said 54 cameras. A 9 July 2025 supplemental memo from the City Manager and Police Chief corrected it: "the correct total is 38 ALPR cameras."
Documented · PPD ALPR page ↗ Documented · Flock portal ↗ The Police Department's ALPR page lists 34 current or planned camera locations as of 24 September 2026. Pleasanton PD's Flock portal, updated 19 Oct 2026, lists 47 total cameras, described as "LPR and other cameras."
What we have not verified: Unknown how many of the portal's 47 cameras read plates, and how cameras map to the 34 listed locations. Some locations may have more than one camera. We will report those facts only when records establish them.
Pleasanton keeps ALPR data for 30 days
Documented · Policy 446 ↗ Policy 446.5 says all ALPR data should be stored for a maximum of 30 days, then purged unless it has become, or may become, evidence.
Documented · PPD ALPR page ↗ Documented · Flock portal ↗ Documented · July 2026 memo ↗ The other records agree. The ALPR page says data is purged automatically after 30 days, the Flock portal lists 30 days, and the July 2026 memo says both the former Vigilant system and the current Flock system retain data for thirty days. That supersedes a 2023 presentation's description of a two-year Vigilant retention period.
In August 2026, Flock announced it would lower its recommended default retention from 30 days to seven days. A vendor default is not a local policy. Existing customers keep the periods their jurisdictions approved, and as of 19 Oct 2026 Pleasanton's portal still listed 30 days.
Our campaign position: 30 days is 30 days too many for people suspected of no crime.
What does “deleted after X days” actually mean?
A stated retention period normally describes how long ALPR data is kept under the system's ordinary retention policy. It should not automatically be interpreted to mean that every copy of the data becomes permanently and irretrievably destroyed when that period expires.
When litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated, potentially relevant information may become subject to a litigation hold, suspending its ordinary disposition. Investigations, evidentiary requirements, subpoenas and other lawful preservation requirements may also result in particular information being retained beyond the normal retention period.
Electronic information may also exist in more than one place: production systems, backups, replicas, exports, investigative files, evidence repositories, or copies previously provided to another agency. Deleting a record from the primary ALPR system therefore does not, by itself, establish that every copy has ceased to exist or that no recoverable copy remains.
The public deserves specific answers:
- What exactly happens when the stated retention period expires?
- Is the information removed from a searchable database, or actually destroyed?
- Are backups, replicas and exported copies also deleted?
- What happens to information already shared with another agency?
- What circumstances suspend ordinary deletion?
- How long can information subject to a litigation hold, investigation or evidentiary requirement remain?
- Can information described as “deleted” remain technically recoverable?
- Who independently verifies that deletion actually occurred?
- What technical standard determines when the data is considered irrecoverable?
- Who bears the cost of auditing and verifying that process?
It is a rule governing ordinary disposition.
When you tell the public “30 days” or “one year,” what exactly happens on day 31 or day 366?
An important distinction: This does not mean that every deleted record must always be recovered or produced. Preservation and production obligations depend on the facts, applicable law, relevance, accessibility, proportionality, legal control, court orders and other circumstances. The narrower point is that expiration of an ordinary retention period does not, by itself, establish that the information no longer exists, cannot be recovered, or cannot be preserved longer when a legal obligation requires it.
No reasonable suspicion or probable cause required
Documented · Policy 446 ↗ Pleasanton's Policy 446.4(b) says an ALPR "may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation; reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR." Policy 446.2 defines a detection as the system reading a plate in public view, along with the vehicle's description and the camera's location. Every passing vehicle is recorded first. The policy's safeguards apply later, when someone searches.
Documented · Policy 446 ↗ Those safeguards are worth knowing:
- No one may operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without department-approved training (446.4(d)).
- An alert must be verified through CLETS, and the plate visually matched, before enforcement action (446.4(e)).
- Access requires an individual login and is logged by name, date and time (446.4(f), 446.6(a)).
- Every detection browsing inquiry must be documented with a case or incident number and/or a reason (446.6(e)).
- At least twice a year, an audit must review at least 10 searches by PPD and 10 by outside agencies (446.7).
- Uses to harass, to target protected characteristics, for personal purposes or to infringe First Amendment rights are prohibited (446.4).
The photograph isn't the issue. The searchable history is.
Which policy number? Pleasanton's Flock portal calls its ALPR policy "Policy 447." In the current policy manual, revised 9 July 2026, the ALPR policy is Policy 446 (manual pages 441–446) and Policy 447 covers Mobile Data Terminal use. We cite 446.
The surveillance denominator
What the system finds matters. So does how much routine travel it records in order to find it.
unique vehicles detected in 30 days
search sessions in the same 30 days
unique vehicles recorded for every search session (762,704 ÷ 229)
hotlist hits in the same 30 days
The figures above are a rolling 30-day snapshot from Pleasanton PD's Flock transparency portal, updated 19 October 2026.
What records would complete the picture
Unknown For a single period, ideally calendar 2025, the public record we have does not show:
- Total plate reads and unique plates recorded
- Searches by PPD and by partner agencies
- Alerts, verified alerts and false or non-actionable alerts
- Stops, arrests and recoveries attributable to ALPR
Policy 446.7 already requires an audit at least twice a year, documented in an internal memorandum to the Chief of Police that records data errors and any improper access or misuse. Those memos are a natural public-records request.
California is actively enforcing the sharing restrictions
In October 2025, the California Attorney General sued the City of El Cajon, alleging that its police department unlawfully shared ALPR data with out-of-state law-enforcement agencies. That does not establish a violation by Pleasanton. It does show that California's sharing restrictions are an active enforcement issue.
Follow the money: what's documented and what isn't
- Documented ceiling · Council agenda ↗ Documented · Council minutes ↗ $639,760 not-to-exceed over five years. On 15 July 2025 the Council approved an agreement with Flock Safety for expansion of the ALPR camera program (Consent Calendar Item 15, approved 5–0). A ceiling is a maximum, not money spent.
- Documented · July 2025 memo ↗ The City's supplemental memo says the agreement covers 38 ALPR cameras, not the 54 in the original staff report.
- Unknown Actual payments to Flock to date, what remained owed under the cancelled Vigilant contract, and the staff time Policy 446 requires: training, alert verification, search documentation and twice-yearly audits.
The contract price is not the total cost of ownership. See why on the home page →
Correction
Earlier versions of this site described a "54-camera replacement program" and used 54 cameras to calculate one ALPR for every 4.0 miles of road. The City corrected the staff report to 38 cameras before the Council vote. At 38 cameras the figure is one ALPR for every 5.7 miles. See all corrections →